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BLESSINGS AND CURSES: ISRAEL AND LEBANON'S MARITIME
BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRAEAN SEA
ANDREW SHIBLEY
ABSTRACT
This note argues that Israel and Lebanon should submit their maritime border dispute to
an arbitral tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Before
submitting the dispute to the tribunal, the two countries should agree upon an exclusive
appellate remedy, to be used in the event that at least one country is unsatisfied with the decision
of the arbitrators. Alternatively, Israel and Lebanon could employ other dispute resolution
options under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or submit to the
International Court of Justice. It is important that Israel and Lebanon find a speedy resolution to
their maritime conflict, so that both countries can fully exploit their offshore natural resources,
without the need to worry about violating international law and encroaching upon the other
state's Exclusive Economic Zone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Love one another but make not a bond of love: Let it rather be a moving sea between the
shores of your souls. Fill each other's cup but drink not from one cup. Give one another of your
bread but eat not from the same loaf. Sing and dance together and be joyous, but let each one of
you be alone."
One of the largest offshore discoveries of natural gas in the last decade is located in the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea.' Because of this discovery, Israel could realistically transition from
an energy dependent state to an energy exporter.2 Lebanon too has claimed legal ownership over
a portion of the natural gas, based on the Lebanese government's interpretation of their national
maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea. Cyprus presents a third and less controversial
dimension to the conflict. Unlike the relationship between Israel and Lebanon, Cyprus has signed
maritime delimitation agreements with both Israel and Lebanon.4
Perhaps the key moment in igniting the maritime border dispute occurred when the
United States Geological Survey published an assessment in 2010,s estimating that the Levant
Basin Province holds, "a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and a mean of 122 trillion
cubic feet of recoverable gas." 6 Israel and Lebanon believe that these discoveries will help
1 Khalil Gibran, On Marriage.
2 Ethan Bronner, Gas Field Confirmed Off The Coast of Israel, Middle East, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 30,
2010) http://www.nytimes.con2010/12/31/world/middleeast/31leviathan.html?_r=2&.
2 id.
3 See Martin Withlisch, Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil and Gas Dispute - Rules of International Maritime Law, Amer.
Soc. of Int'l L., Dec. 5, 2011, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/3 1/israel-lebanon-offshore-
oil-gas-dispute-%E2%80%93-rules-international-maritime.
4 Simon Henderson, Cyprus Helping with Israel-Lebanon Maritime Dispute, Policy Analysis, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cyprus-helping-with-israel-lebanon-
maritime-dispute.
5 U.S. Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province,
Eastern Mediterranean, (Mar. 2010) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS 10-3014.pdf.
6 Id.
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sustain their national economies long-term due to the current lack of significant gas or oil
production in either state.' The enormous economic potential,' and the poor political relationship
that exists between Israel and Lebanon, 9 create the need for international law to provide a
solution to the conflict.
Section II of this note will discuss the political history and tension between Israel and
Lebanon. Section II will also provide a brief history of Cyprus, and explain how it has come to
be a politically divided country. Finally, Section II will discuss the nature and current condition
of the energy sectors in Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon. Section III of this note will provide an
overview of how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS" or "the
convention") operates to resolve maritime disputes, including a discussion of the judicial body
under UNCLOS, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"). Section III will
also discuss the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the role that the ICJ could play in a
maritime dispute case. Section IV will address the recently resolved Indonesia-Philippine
maritime boundary conflict. Section IV will also elaborate on the current state of the Cyprus-
Israel-Lebanon maritime dispute. Section V will discuss the viability of the dispute resolution
options discussed in Section III, in the context of the Cyprus-Israel-Lebanon maritime conflict.
Finally, Section VI will recommend the most optimal dispute resolution alternative as applied to
the maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean.
It is imperative that Israel and Lebanon come to a binding and final resolution to their
maritime boundary dispute. Maritime delimitation law has become increasingly well settled, and
therefore, most of the procedural options will produce substantially similar results. The most
ideal method of resolution for Israel and Lebanon would involve submitting the dispute to an
international tribunal. That tribunal would issue a binding decision, and that decision could be
' Israel relies on oil imports for 99% of its national consumption. Daniel Engber, Where Does Israel Get Oil?,
SLATE.COM, (July 14, 2006, 6:19 PM),
http://www.slate.conarticles/news-and-politics/explainer/2006/07/where does-israel-getoil.html. Lebanon too
relies mostly on oil imports. In 2010, Lebanon imported 120,000 barrels per day of refined oil, which satisfied over
90% of the country's primary energy needs. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Note, Lebanon, (last
updated Mar. 2014), http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=le.
See Wthlisch, supra note 3.
9 See generally Simon Murden, Understanding Israel's Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative
Approach to Security During the Peace Process, 27:1 Brit. J. of Middle Eastern Stud. 25 (May 2000).
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appealed by an unsatisfied party, pursuant to a previously agreed upon exclusive appellate
procedure. Ideally, the appellate procedure would involve a secondary and separate tribunal,
which could in turn review the decision of the initial tribunal, then come to its own binding and
non-appealable decision.
II. ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND CYPRUS:
POLITICAL HISTORIES, RELATIONS, AND THE ENERGY SECTORS
A. Context of Israeli-Lebanese Relations
Lebanon and Israel have officially been in a constant state of war since 1948.10 In 1948,
Israel declared its independence from the British Mandate, which was carried over from World
War I.11 Within a year, the first Arab-Israeli war broke out, resulting in Israel obtaining more
land than it was originally promised, Jordan annexing the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and
Egypt occupying the Gaza Strip.12 In 1967, the Six Day War broke out between Israel and
multiple Arab states, most prominently Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 13 After six days of fighting,
Israel regained control of East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, Sinai, and the entire
West Bank. 14
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has directly and indirectly led to a great deal of Israel's
security concerns. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation ("PLO") was founded in 1964 by
Arab governments that wanted to create a Palestinian organization, "that would remain
essentially under their [the Arab governments'] control."15 However, by 1969, Yasser Arafat
became the chairman of the PLO and brought with him a sense of independence from other Arab
governments. 16
1o Associated Press, History of the Lebanese-Israeli Conflict, World, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 17, 2006,
12:48 PM) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/AR2006071700340.html.
" Brit. Broad. Co., Israel Profile: A Chronology of Key Events, Middle East, BBC.COM (last updated Jan. 28,
2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29123668.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Brit. Broad. Co., A History of Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians, Middle East, BBC.COM (last updated 2005)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle-east/03/v3_iptimeline/html/.
16 Id.
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In the late 1960's, Lebanon began to allow Palestinian militants access to a region in
Southern Lebanon in order to infiltrate and attack Israel.17 The fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War,
which began in 1975, decimated Lebanon.18 The beginning of the Lebanese Civil War arguably
led to the demise of the socioeconomic identities and divisions within the country and reaffirmed
the traditional, "...rigid sectarian divisions," relating to religion, tribe, and region.1 9
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 led to a roughly three-year period where Israel
and the United States were heavily involved in the internal affairs of Lebanon. 20 The Israeli
invasion was intended to remove the Palestinian guerillas from Southern Lebanon, but Israel
surpassed its original goal and eradicated the PLO from Lebanon. 21 However, in 1984, most
Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanese territory, except for maintaining a small presence in an
area of Southern Lebanon.22 The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon allowed Syria to
regain most of the power and influence that it had over Lebanon before the Israeli invasion.23
Political turmoil and violence continued during the 1980's. In 1989, Lebanese Army
commander Michael Aoun declared a, "'War of Liberation' ostensibly against all foreign
forces," but in essence, this movement was directed at ousting the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 24
In spite of the intended goal, the "War of Liberation" led to an increase in Syrian troops within
Lebanese borders. 25 The Lebanese Civil War continued with devastating, "intra-confessional
clashes," between the Maronite and the Shia sects. 26 The United States gained interest and
17 History of the Lebanese-Israeli Conflict, World, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 17, 2006, 12:48 PM)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/AR2006071700340.html.
" Brit. Broad. Co., Lebanon Profile, Middle East, BBC.COM (last updated Nov. 4, 2014)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 14649284.
19 Hassan Krayem, The Lebanese Civil War and the TaifAgreement, American University of Beirut,
http://ddc.aub.edu.1b/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
20 Id.
21 Brit. Broad. Co., A History of Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians, supra note 15.
22 Krayem, supra note 19.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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influence in the region due to the Gulf War, and the demise of the Soviet Union.27 Because of
these circumstances and the general belief among the Lebanese that no side could truly win the
Civil War, the Taif Agreement was signed on October 22, 1989 in Taif, Saudi Arabia. 28 The Taif
Agreement, which represented, "a compromise among the Lebanese deputies, political groups
and parties, militias and leaders," effectively ended the Civil War, although it did not resolve all
of the political issues within Lebanon. 29
By 1993, the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians had also gained steam.o
The new leftist Israeli government was ready to talk peace with the Palestinians, and the PLO
was more inclined to engage in the peace process due to the unfavorable results of the first Gulf
War and the PLO's consequentially weakened position in the region. 3 1 The Palestinians agreed to
recognize the state of Israel in exchange for Israel's promise to begin removing its occupying
presence in Palestinian-claimed territories.32 The PLO and Israel reached an agreement in 1993,
and by 1994, the Palestinian National Authority was born and Arafat was elected President of
that Authority, which was to control the autonomous areas vacated by Israel.33 The Israeli-
Palestinian agreement proved unsuccessful because neither side was able to fully fulfill its
commitments, and certain Palestinian factions rejected the terms of the peace agreement; thus,
violence continued.34
The rise of the Lebanese guerilla group Hezbollah, and more military exchanges
throughout the 1990's and in 2006, have contributed to the inability of the two states or groups
within the states to refrain from violence for any extended period of time.3 5 Hezbollah, a group
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See generally Brit. Broad. Co., A History of Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians, supra note 15.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.; Brit. Broad. Co., Israel Profile: A Chronology of Key Events, supra note 11.
35 See generally Associated Press, History of the Lebanese-Israeli Conflict, supra note 10; See generally Brit. Broad.
Co., Lebanon Profile, supra note 18.
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that represents a "radical Shiite movement," rose to power in Lebanon in the early 1980's during
the Lebanese Civil War.3 6 Hezbollah was formed with the goal of completely destroying and
removing the Israeli presence in Lebanon, and doing so by any means necessary.37 Hezbollah
emerged as a powerful force due to its bombing of the United States Marine Barracks in Beirut.3 8
The attack on the Marine Barracks killed 241 American servicemen in a single attack, "the
largest single-day death toll for the Marine Corps since Iwo Jima." 39
Under the leadership of the then newly selected (and current) Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah, Hezbollah began successfully involving itself in Lebanese politics and political
elections by 1992.40 Hezbollah's goal of eradicating Israeli forces from Lebanon was achieved in
2000 when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak ordered the removal of the Israeli forces in
Southern Lebanon.41 Because of Hezbollah's success against Israel, other anti-Israeli
governments, such as those in Iran and Syria, continued to support Hezbollah's efforts against
the Israeli state.
The assassination of Lebanese Prime-Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, which was widely
blamed on the Syrians, led to a vacuum in power which was to be filled either by Hezbollah and
its allies or by Hariri's son, Saad Hariri, who was supported by Saudi Arabia and many Western
governments.42 By 2006, Hezbollah and Israel were again engaged in a war that ended in a
United Nations sponsored cease-fire that came roughly a month after the beginning of the war.43
Since 2006, Lebanon has been hampered with political gridlocks, such as those that occurred in
36 Robert F. Worth, Hezbollah's Rise Amid Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.coni2011/01/16/weekinreview/16worth.html?_r-0.
37 Alyssa Fetini, A Brief History of: Hizballah, TIME, June 8, 2009, available at
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903301,00.html.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Worth, supra note 36.
43 Fetini, supra note 37.
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2008, 2011, and 2013, respectively.44 The Syrian conflict has further destabilized Lebanon, in
part, due to the some 700,000 Syrian refugees that were reported to have fled to Lebanon after
the Syrian crisis broke out in 2011.45
B. A Brief History of Cyprus
Although the primary issue here concerns finding a proper resolution to the maritime
boundary dispute between Israel and Lebanon, Cyprus is still relevant to this discussion because
Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon all share Exclusive Economic Zones ("EEZ's"). 46 Therefore, each
country must make an agreement with each of the other two countries, in order to finalize the
coordinates of each country's EEZ.47
An initial issue with many problems involving Cyprus is that the country is divided
between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north.48 Turkey has a long history of
involving itself in Cyprus, dating back to the Ottoman Empire.49 In the early to mid 20" century,
Cyprus was under rule as a British colony, after having been annexed from the Ottoman Empire
by Great Britain in 1914.5o In 1955, Greek Cypriots launched a war against the British in an
attempt to become unified with Greece. 51
Although initially Britain resisted, by 1960, Cyprus gained its independence because of
the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee, along with the creation of the Cypriot constitution. 52
Britain, Greece, and Turkey came together to sign the Treaty of Guarantee, which contained
44 Brit. Broad. Co., Lebanon Profile, supra note 18.
45 Id.
46 See Henderson, Cyprus Helping with Israel-Lebanon Maritime Dispute, supra note 4.
47 Id.
48 John Defterios and Eoghan Macguire, Cypriot President: Underwater gas field can help unite the island,
CNN.COM (last updated Aug. 25, 2014), http://edition.cnn.con2014/04/23/business/cyprus-president-energy-gas-
oil/.
49 Brit. Broad. Co., Cyprus Profile, Middle East, BBC.COM (last updated Nov. 11, 2014)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17219505.
5 0 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
57
provisions giving each of the three signatory countries a right to intervene in Cypriot affairs
under certain enumerated circumstances.s5 Archbishop Markarios, who was the leader of the
Greek unification movement, was elected as the first president of an independent Cyprus in
1959.54 In 1963, Makarios proposed constitutional changes that were unwelcomed by Turkey,
and therefore, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the "power sharing" government that had just
been established a few years earlier.55 The Greek government led an unsuccessful coup against
Makarios, causing Turkey to send troops to the northern area of Cyprus. 56 Turkey then occupied
a northern portion of Cyprus, where the dividing line was based on a ceasefire line, "the Green
Line," set up by United Nations peacekeepers in 1963.57 The international community failed to
persuade Turkey to withdraw from the island, and the Turkish Cypriot's proceeded to establish a
government in the north, separate from the original unified Cypriot government.
Till this day, Cyprus is still not a unified country.5 8 In 2003, the border restrictions on the
Green Line were finally eased, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots were allowed some access to
either side of the island.59 Cyprus joined the European Union ("EU") in 2003 as one entity;
however, in practicality, the Greek Cypriot government maintains the seat in the EU, and most
EU law is suspended in Turkish Cyprus until the two Cypriot governments reach a formal
settlement and reunification. 60
53 Id.
54 The Editors of Encyclopedia, Makarios III, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/359142/Makarios-II (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
5 See Brit. Broad. Co., Cyprus Profile, supra note 49.
56 Id.
57 Id.
5 See generally id.
59 Id; see also Brit. Broad. Co., Emotion as Cyprus Border Opens, Europe, BBC.COM (Apr. 23, 2003)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2969089.stm.
60 Brit. Broad. Co., Cyprus Profile, supra note 49; see also Turkish Cypriot Community, Cyprus, European
Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/turkish-cypriots/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
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C. Nature and Condition of the Israeli, Lebanese and Cypriot Energy Sectors
1. Israeli Energy Sector
Israel's geopolitical location in the Middle East has led the state to function "as an energy
island," without an energy infrastructure connecting it to other oil-rich neighboring states, with
the exception of its energy-related relationship with Egypt. 61 Furthermore, Israel has two acute
energy concerns involving security.62 Israel must ensure that it maintains a supply of energy in
times of war or military conflict, while also maintaining security over its energy infrastructure. 63
Because of these security concerns, Israel appears to handle its energy policies as issues of
security rather than economics. 64 Countries that treat energy as a security issue may break down
energy security into three components: "...reliability, affordability, and environmental
sustainability." 65 Israel has historically demonstrated a clear focus on the reliability aspect of
energy security, which has led the country to prioritize coal and oil.66 Natural gas on the other
hand requires a greater level of long-term infrastructure and supply contracts, which has made
Israeli investments in this resource less common. 67
Israel's concerns about its energy security are well founded considering the prominent
role that Arab oil producers maintain in the world oil market, as well as the tactics that those
countries have used to block or attempt to block energy resources from entering Israel during
critical violent conflicts. 68 Changes in the landscape of the world oil market since the 1970's
may be viewed as advantageous to Israel, but Israel's energy policy has been slow to react to
61 Brenda Shaffer, Israel: New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean, 39:9 Int'l J. of the Political, Econ.,
Planning, Envtl. and Soc. Aspects of Energy 5379 (Sept. 2011). The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty of 1979
guaranteed Israel the right to bid for, "Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption;"
however, as Israeli energy needs have increased, Egyptian oil exports began to account for far less of Israel's total
oil consumption. See Engber, supra note 7.
62 Shaffer, supra note 61.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 5380.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 5379-80.
6 7 Id. at 5380.
68 Id.
59
these changes. 69 Some of these "dramatic changes" to the world oil market include how oil trade
is now mainly conducted, "between companies on spot markets" and the decline of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' influence and market dominance. 70
Israel's strategy regarding the development of its energy resources has involved mainly a
privatization approach, subsequently precluding most state involvement in the energy
development field.n One major drawback to this policy relates back to Israel's poor relationship
with many Arab and oil-rich countries. 72 Some private companies may choose not to seek
potentially attractive opportunities for energy development in Israel because other oil-rich and
anti-Israeli countries might prevent those companies that do invest in Israel from investing in
their own countries.73
Beginning in 1999, Israel discovered its first commercially recoverable fossil fuel. 74 In
2009 and 2010, more natural gas was discovered off of Israel's coast in the Tamar, Dalit, and
Leviathan gas fields.75 Those three fields are collectively estimated to hold 714 billion cubic
meters ("BCM") of natural gas, with the majority of that gas lying in the Leviathan field. 76 While
Israel's domestic consumption of natural gas stood at about 5.2 BCM per year in 2010, the Israeli
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. The Noa and Mari-B fields, together known as Yam Tethys contained 32 billion cubic meters of natural gas in
1999. Both fields were used to provide electricity in Israel billion over the next decade, and both have been mostly
depleted since 2013. Id.; See also Sara Toth Stub, Well in Yam Tethys gas reserve to be abandoned, NEWS,
WORLDOIL.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.worldoil.connews/2013/8/5/well-in-yam-tethys-gas-reserve-to-be-
abandoned.
75 Shaffer, supra note 61, at 5380-81. The Gaza Marine Field, discovered in 2000, holds about 35 billion cubic
meters of natural gas; however, this field lies within the occupied territory of the Palestinian authority. Therefore,
Israel could not legally treat this field as within its maritime territory. Id.; See also Simon Henderson, Natural Gas
in the Palestinian Authority: The Potential of the Gaza Marine Offshore Field, THE GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND OF THE UNITED STATES: MEDITERRANEAN POLICY PROGRAM, Mar. 2014, at 1, available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Henderson20l40301 -GermanMarshallFund.pdf.
76 Shaffer, supra note 61, at 5380-8 1. The Tamar field is estimated to hold 240 BCM of natural gas, the Dalit field is
estimated to hold 14 BCM of natural gas, and the Leviathan field is estimated to hold 460 BCM of natural gas. Id.
60
Ministry of National Infrastructure projects this to increase to 12.1 BCM per year by 2020 and
17.9 BCM per year by 2030.7 Please see the attached graphic for the full projections.7 1
Two unusual issues relating to Israel's energy needs concern Israel's method of water
production, as well as Israel's energy relationship with the Palestinian Authority. 79 Israel
produces much of its water by desalinating seawater, and that process comes at a cost and
requires a great deal of energy.80 The State of Israel's Water Authority estimates that the,
"energetic and financial cost of production per cubic meter of desalinating water in Israel is
respectively, 3.5 kilowatt hours and US 650."1 Compared to other similar desalination facilities
in the world, Israel's energy and cost efficiency is relatively strong.82 The Sorek desalination
plant, one of a handful of large desalination plants in Israel, produces about 20% of Israel's
77 Ministry of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources, Forecast Demand, The Natural Gas Sector,
http://energy.gov.il/English/Subjects/Natural%20Gas/Pages/GxmsMniNGEconomy.aspx.
78 Id.
79 Shaffer, supra note 61, at 5380.
so Id.
" Abraham Tenne, State of Israel Water Authority, Desalination Division, Sea Water Desalination in Israel:
Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, (Oct. 2010)
http://www.water.gov.il/hebrew/planning-and-development/desalination/documents/desalination-in-israel.pdf. The
energetic and financial costs provided are estimates as of October 2010. Id.
82 See id.
61
municipal water, totaling, "624,000 cubic meters of potable water each day."83 The Sorek plant is
able to meet a typical family's water needs for $300 to $500 per year.84 While desalination is
usually a costly and sometimes inefficient method for obtaining drinkable water, it appears that
Israel is successfully leading the way to cut down the costs of desalination.8 5
The other unusual energy issue facing Israel is the country's relationship with the
Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank face large
challenges in providing sufficient electricity for the inhabitants. 86 In 2010, Palestinian territories
were only able to produce electricity to cover 10% of demand.87 The other 90% of the electricity
demand was supplied through electricity imports, mostly originating from Israel, with some
minor support from Jordanian and Egyptian power grids.88
Although the Palestinians have been unable to cover their own energy needs, the Gaza
Marine field provides hope for the future. 89 The Gaza Marine field, discovered in 2000 and
containing 31 BCM of natural gas, is one of the earlier discoveries of untapped natural gas in the
Eastern Mediterranean.90 Since the discovery, the gas in the Gaza field has remained unexploited
due to failed negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and prospective developers. 91
Political factors may also be playing a role, as Israel could have concerns about the ability of
Palestinian political and militant organization Hamas to control and profit from the Gaza field.92
83 Associated Press, Israel's desalination program averts future water crises, Haaretz, May 31, 2014, available at
http://www.haaretz.com/life/nature-environment/1.596270.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See generally Henderson, Natural Gas in the Palestinian Authority: The Potential of the Gaza Marine Offshore
Field, supra note 75, at 3.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 Jennifer Baker, Bombing for Oil: Gaza, Israel, and the Levant Basin, REVOLUTION NEWS, (July 22, 2014),
http://revolution-news.com/bombing-oil-gaza-israel-levant-basin/.
91 Dania Akkad, Dispute breaks out over Palestinian-Israeli gas deal, News, MIDDLE EAST EYE, (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestinian-israeli-gas-deal-still-despite-claims-top-pa-official-1202224801.
92 Allison Good, A War over Energy in Gaza?, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, July 22, 2014, available at
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-over-energy-gaza- 10923.
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It is legally unclear whether Israel has rights to exploit any part of the Gaza field; however, it
appears that the Palestinians could benefit from the field more, considering the Israeli fields of
Tamar and Leviathan contain 30 times more natural gas then the Gaza field.93
Although Israel appears to have much to be optimistic about considering the offshore
natural gas discoveries, 94 there are still many obstacles that may prevent Israel from quickly
becoming a relevant energy exporter.95 Like any state seeking a transition from energy importer
to energy exporter, Israel should prioritize and form policy regarding domestic needs, before
moving forward with exportation. 96 Despite the lack of any Israeli laws relating to the
consumption of the natural gas, Delek Energy, a private, Israeli owned company with a major
stake in the new discoveries, has already announced its plans to export those resources. 97 Other
concerns, such as a European market already flooded with natural gas and issues relating to the
infrastructure of potential importing states, may also diminish Israel's ability to capitalize on
their offshore resources. 98
2. Lebanese Energy Sector
Just as Israel's energy policies are highly dependent on political and security issues,99 so
too are Lebanese energy policies. 100 Unlike Israel, however, much of Lebanon's political issues
stem from their own internal governmental ineffectiveness. Such political ineffectiveness has,
"proved to be highly disruptive to government projects, and the country's nascent oil and gas
sector has been hit with delays."101 For example, the Lebanese government's political deadlocks
93 Id.
94 U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 5.
95 Shaffer, supra note 61, at 5386.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 5380.
100 See generally MENA industry report: Lebanon's oil and gas potential remains untapped amid tension, Oil and
Gas, HSBC GLOBAL CONNECTIONS, (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/uae/en/articles/lebanons-oil-and-gas-potential-remains-untapped-amid-tension.
101 Id.
63
have led to the postponement of, "the licensing of 10 offshore blocks."102 These political issues
have also had the effect of dissuading foreign investment into the offshore resources.10 3
The root cause of Lebanon's political ineffectiveness can be traced to the demographics
of the country and the confessionalist republic that has existed since the state's creation. The
United States Central Intelligence Agency provides the following breakdown of Lebanon's
religious sects: Muslim 54% (27% Sunni, 27% Shia), Christian 40.5% (21% Maronite Catholic,
8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 6.5% other Christian) Druze 5.6%, and very small
numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, Hindus, and Mormons. 104 All of these groups coexist in a
country that is smaller than the state of Connecticut.10 5 Further, the confessionalist system
integrates these religious divides into one government, where a given religion is entitled to a
certain seat in the government. 106 The president must be a Maronite Catholic, "the Prime
Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim."1 0 7
Finally, to complicate the sectarian tensions that manifest themselves in the structure of the
government, the powerful Shia political and militant group Hezbollah has become a key player
in Lebanese politics.108
Aside from Lebanon's political struggles, its natural resources have historically been
scarce. 109 Lebanon has often been considered a water-rich country in a water-deficient region;
however, recent projections demonstrate that Lebanon could encounter a critical water shortage
102 Id.
103 See generally id.
1 Lebanon, Library, Publications, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last updated
June 20, 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.
105 Lebanon is 5,405 square miles including water, whereas Connecticut is 5,544 square miles including water. Id.;
See also US States, Area and Ranking, ENCHANTED LEARNING, (last accessed Jan. 26, 2014),
http://www.enchantedlearning.comlusa/states/area.shtml.
106 See Brit. Broad. Co., Lebanon Profile, supra note 18.
107 Id.
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109 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Overview/Data, Lebanon, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-
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as soon as 2020.110 Although Lebanon has never produced energy from petroleum, natural gas,
or coal, the country is now equipped with the offshore resources to begin development."' Unlike
Israel, Lebanon has yet to begin to capitalize on these recoverable resources due to political
gridlock. 112
The Lebanese Parliament has yet to approve two pieces of legislation that are critical to
the development of the even territorially undisputed marine oil and gas fields." One piece of
legislation relates to the, "division of Lebanon's Exclusive Economic Zone into blocs." 114 The
other involves Lebanon's legal relationship to the bid-winning companies that will be developing
the resources in their respective blocs. 115 The reason for the political ineffectiveness regarding
this legislation is unclear; however, political corruption and external political influences are
likely playing a role.1 16 This stalemate is leaving Lebanon behind while countries in relatively
similar energy situations, like Israel and Cyprus, continue to push forward with licensing and
exploitation of energy resources.1 17
Despite Lebanon's political obstacles, the country may still be optimistic about its future
in energy considering the still unknown quantity of recoverable resources, as well as Lebanon's
connection to the Arab Gas Pipeline.118 The connection to the Arab Gas Pipeline could serve as a
potentially lucrative tool for Lebanon to use to export energy to Europe through Turkey. 119
110 Lebanese Centre for Water Conservation and Management, United Nations Development Programme in
Lebanon, http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/operations/projects/environment-andenergy/lebanese-
centre-for-water-conservation-and-management--lcwcm-.html.
" See generally MENA industry report: Lebanon's oil and gas potential remains untapped amid tension, Oil and
Gas, supra note 100.
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113 Carine Torbey, Political impasse stops Lebanon exploiting oil resources, Middle East, News, BBC.COM, (Feb.
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European countries in general would like to decrease their reliance on Russia for energy and
could turn to a country like Lebanon, with some preexisting infrastructure in the Arab Gas
Pipeline. 120 The political instability in Syria, however, could become devastating to Lebanon's
European exportation prospects. 121 In order to export to Europe, Lebanon can only go through
Syria to the North, which can in turn go through Turkey, and thus to Europe. 122 Therefore,
Lebanon's ability to rely on Syria as an economic partner is largely connected to Lebanon's
future in energy exportation. 123
3. Cypriot Energy Sector
Cyprus has traditionally relied on tourism, business services, and shipping to support its
national economy, 124 but much changed in 2011, when Noble Energy announced its discovery of
the Aphrodite natural gas field, contained within Cyprus' EEZ. 125 Reports as of early 2015
indicate that the Aphrodite field contains around 127 BCM of natural gas. 126 This discovery
affords Cyprus an incredible opportunity to secure national energy stability and enter into the
world energy trade. 127
Cyprus has considered building a liquefied natural gas ("LNG") terminal in order to
liquefy and export to Europe and East Asia. 128 Though such a project would cost billions of
dollars, Cyprus could reach out to Israel, Lebanon, large international oil and gas companies, and
other parties that could benefit from the terminal, in order to attract financial assistance for the
120 Id.
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123 See generally id.
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project. 129 Israel and Lebanon might be inclined to participate because Cyprus could offer those
countries the opportunity to have their own natural gas liquefied by the Cyprus terminal, and
then distributed to other markets.13 0 As of now, Cyprus has tabled this option,13 1 but building the
LNG pipeline certainly remains a unique possibility.
In 2015, Greek Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiadis reached out to Russia in an attempt
to find a new mediator to resolve the increasingly burdensome governmental divide on the
island. 132 The lack of governmental unity in Cyprus is becoming increasingly problematic
because Turkey has maintained the position that Greek Cyprus should not begin exploiting the
country's offshore oil and gas until a final settlement between both sides of the island is
completed.13 3 As of now, peace talks between the Greek and Turkish Cyprus governments have
been suspended; however, United Nations Special Adviser on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, is
optimistic that talks will resume at some point in the spring of 2015.134
III. RESOLVING MARITIME DISPUTES WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. UNCLOS
UNCLOS13 s is, "comprehensive attempt to deal with... issues concerning the high seas
and territorial and coastal areas, including ownership, resource exploitation, and passage
rights."1 36 UNCLOS sets forth six general categories of territorial waters, including one category
that is only relevant to archipelagic states. 3 ' The other five main categories, beginning from
129 Id.
130 Id.
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135 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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nearest to the coast and extending outward toward international waters, consist of internal
waters, 1 territorial waters, 139 contiguous zone, 140 EEZ, 141 and continental shelf.142
Under UNCLOS, a country's EEZ, "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." 143 Further, the EEZ will be
found beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters,14 which also includes the contiguous
zone. 145 Another important EEZ provision provides that, "the coastal State has sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources [in
the EEZ]."146
Cyprus and Lebanon have both ratified UNCLOS; 147 however, Israel is not a party to the
convention. 14 Nevertheless, UNCLOS is an important guide to resolving the dispute because of
its mostly agreed upon status as customary, and therefore binding, international law. 149
Regardless of how Israel and Lebanon eventually agree upon their maritime boundaries, it is
likely that the principles of UNCLOS will play a major role.150
138 Id. at Part II, Sec. 2, Art. 8.
139 Id. at Art. 3.
14 0 Id. at Sec. 4, Art. 33.
141 See generally id. at Part V.
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1. Annex V Conciliation
Because Lebanon is a party to UNCLOS,15 1 conciliation would be one of the various
procedural options available to resolve the dispute under UNCLOS.152 A state party to
UNCLOS, "may invite the other party [to the dispute].. .to submit the dispute to conciliation."15 3
If Israel accepted Lebanon's invitation, and the two states could agree upon the conciliation
procedure, then either state could submit the dispute to the chosen procedure. 154 However, if
Israel either rejected Lebanon's invitation, or if the two countries could not agree upon a
conciliation procedure, then conciliation would be terminated.1 55
The parties to the conciliation would have flexibility in choosing their conciliators
because the parties are free to choose from a list of conciliators that is maintained by the United
Nations Secretary-General; 156 however, the conciliators from the list are only preferred by
UNCLOS, not required.1 57 Furthermore, each party may choose one conciliator who is a state
national of that party,1ss which could provide a good balance between purely bilateral
negotiations on the one hand and mere third party dictation of the final resolution on the other. If
the state parties cannot agree upon the chairman of the conciliation within 30 days of when the
other conciliators have been chosen, then either state may request that the United Nations
Secretary-General appoint the chairman of the conciliation from the United Nations maintained
list, and with consultation of the parties.
The conciliation commission has a maximum of 12 months to provide, "conclusions on all
questions of fact or law relevant to the matter in dispute," including recommendations deemed
appropriate for an amicable settlement, if no agreement has already been reached. 159 Although
151 Wthlisch, supra note 3.
152 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex XV, Sec. 1, Art. 284.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at Annex V, Sec. 1, Art. 3.
157 Id.
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there are many benefits to the conciliation procedure, the main disadvantage is that the final
report of the commission is not binding on the state parties.1 60
2. Arbitration under UNCLOS
An arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS is substantially similar to conciliation with regard to
the procedure involved in appointing arbitrators. 161 The main difference between these two
methods of dispute resolution boils down to the binding nature of arbitral decisions. 162 Unlike
conciliation under UNCLOS,163 the parties to the dispute shall comply with the decision of the
arbitral tribunal and that decision is final. 164
3. ITLOS
If all peaceful negotiations have failed, and recourse to conciliation pursuant to UNCLOS
was unsuccessful or cannot be procedurally agreed upon by Israel and Lebanon, then UNCLOS
provides that the parties should resort to one of the following options: (a) ITLOS; 165 (b) the
International Court of Justice; 166 (c) an arbitral tribunal; 167 and or (d) a special arbitral tribunal. 168
160 id.
161 See generally id. at Annex VII; see id. at Annex V.
162 Id. at Annex VII, Art. 10-11.
163 See generally id. at Annex V.
1 Id. at Annex VII, Art. 11. If, however, appellate procedures are agreed upon in advance, then those appellate
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165 In accordance with Annex VI of UNCLOS (concerning the organization, competence and procedure of ITLOS,
as well as the Seabed Disputes Chamber, and procedure of amendments). See generally id. at Annex VI, Sec. 2, Art.
21.
166 See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice, (June 26, 1945), available at http://www.icj-
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ITLOS is a judicial body that was created through UNCLOS for the purpose of
adjudicating conflicts that are based on the interpretation and application of the convention. 169
ITLOS consists of 21 members, who are elected in consideration of equitable geographical
fairness and, "among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of
recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea." 170 The members of ITLOS retain the
authority to decide the procedure of the tribunal.1 7 1 ITLOS must decide the legal issues by a
majority vote of the present members; the President of the tribunal is given the deciding vote in
the event of a tie. 172 Finally, ITLOS' decision as to any case brought before it is, "...final and
shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute."
B. The International Court of Justice
Although ITLOS was created as a specialized judicial body tasked with resolving
maritime disputes, other international tribunals exist. UNCLOS provides that states need not
automatically submit their dispute to ITLOS once settlement negotiations break down.17 1 When
a state signs, ratifies or accedes to UNCLOS, the state is free to declare which of four general
adjudicatory procedures it wishes to abide by in the event of a conflict regarding the
interpretation and application of the convention. 174 In this case, neither Lebanon nor Cyprus have
submitted any type of declaration, reservation, or understanding with respect to the choice of
procedure provision or any other provision in the convention. 175
The ICJ is another international tribunal that would be available to Lebanon and Israel.
The ICJ is the United Nations judicial tribunal tasked with deciding cases involving state
169 The Tribunal, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=O; see
generally 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex VI.
170 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Part XV, Sec. 2, Art. 287.
171 Id. at Annex VI, Sec. 1, Art. 16.
172 Id. at Annex VI, Sec. 3, Art. 29.
173 See id. at Annex VI, Sec. 1, Art. 2.
174 See id. at Part XV, Sec. 2, Art. 287.
175 United Nations, United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Declarations made upon signature,
ratification, accession, succession, or anytime thereafter, OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS,
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention-agreements/conventiondeclarations.htm.
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parties.176 Neither Lebanon nor Israel has declared the ICJ's jurisdiction to be compulsory;"
therefore, both of these United Nations member states would have to consent to the jurisdiction
of the court, in the context of the maritime conflict, in order for the ICJ to decide the case under
proper jurisdictional grounds.1 78
The ICJ's statute provides that the Court will decide cases in accordance with
international law. 179 Further, the Court will apply international conventions, international
custom, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and the judicial decisions
and teachings of the most highly qualified personnel from the various nations. 180 The Court
would likely give great weight to the maritime delimitation provisions contained in UNCLOS
because the convention is both an international convention and is generally considered to be
customary international law.181
Although the ICJ is likely to apply the same law as ITLOS, there are still important
factors that may influence which of these judicial alternatives are more favorable to Israel and
Lebanon. The tribunals differ greatly in their length of existence, number of cases decided, and
judicial membership. First, the ICJ was established in 1945;182 whereas ITLOS was created in
conjunction with UNCLOS in 1982.18 Second, the ICJ has decided well over 100 cases and has
given 26 advisory opinions; 184 whereas ITLOS has decided 23 cases and has given two advisory
176 33 U.N.T.S. 993 at Art. 36.
177 United Nations, International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as
Compulsory, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3.
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184 United Nations, International Court of Justice, List of Cases referred to the Court since 1946 by date of
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opinions. 185 Third and finally, the ICJ consists of 15 judicial members, each from a different
country, and each elected for possessing, "the qualifications required in their respective countries
for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or [those who] are jurisconsults of recognized
competence in international law." 186 Thus, no specialized expertise in the field of the law of the
sea is necessarily required for membership on the ICJ.187 Whereas, the judicial membership of
ITLOS is composed of members who, "are of recognized competence in the field of the law of
the sea." 188
IV. BREAKING DOWN RECENT MARITIME CONFLICTS
A. Indonesia-Philippine Maritime Conflict
Reference to another recently resolved maritime dispute might help clarify how Cyprus,
Israel and Lebanon can work to resolve their current maritime dispute. After 20 years of
uncertainty and negotiations, Indonesia and the Philippines delimited their maritime boundaries
in May of 2014 by means of mutual agreement. 189 Similar to the Eastern Mediterranean conflict,
Indonesia and the Philippines have overlapping EEZ's. 190 The conflict was by no means
identical, as Indonesia and the Philippines are both archipelagic states; 191 however, there are
sufficient similarities that provide a helpful comparison.
Indonesia and the Philippines are both ratified members of UNCLOS, but even with that
mutual starting point, the agreement still took 20 years to negotiate. 192 Indonesia and the
185 United Nations, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, List of Cases, available at
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=35&L= 1AND 1 %253D 1-.; United Nations, International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, Advisory Proceedings, available at
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Philippines established the Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns in
1994 to facilitate their bilateral negotiations. 193 After years of negotiations, and the decision to
accelerate negotiations in 2011, Indonesia and the Philippines were finally able to peacefully
resolve their maritime border dispute in 2014.194 Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono stressed the importance of peaceful resolution, especially in the context of maritime
disputes. 195 Philippine President Benigno Aquino also emphasized the benefits of peaceful
negotiations, as well as the need to uphold the rule of law. 196
Perhaps the key lesson to take away from the Indonesia-Philippine conflict is the
persistence of the two countries in maintaining peaceful negotiations, even after years of
unsuccessful negotiations. The diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines is
not comparable to seemingly nonexistent diplomatic relationship between Israel and Lebanon;
however, the maritime conflict is similar and the operating body of customary international law,
UNCLOS, is the same. Therefore, it would be prudent for Israel and Lebanon to observe the
patience and persistence of Indonesia and the Philippines in resolving their maritime conflict, in
order to reach the economic benefits that come along with peaceful resolution and exploitation of
undisputed resources.
B. State of the Cyprus-Israel-Lebanon Maritime Conflict
In 2007, Lebanon and Cyprus negotiated an agreement delimiting their maritime
boundaries. 197 While the Cypriot government ratified the 2007 agreement, the Lebanese
government has still not ratified the agreement. 198 Lebanon did, however, twice submit
coordinates to the United Nations Secretary-General in 2010, indicating the Lebanese view of its
maritime boundaries with Israel to the south and Cyprus to the southwest. 199 The issue with the
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coordinates that Lebanon submitted to the United Nations is not only that they are different from
the coordinates specified in the 2007 Lebanon-Cyprus agreement, but that they also include an
area that overlaps with territory claimed by Israel.200
In 2010, Israel and Cyprus completed an agreement delimiting their maritime borders.2 01
The 2010 agreement, "used similar coordinates to the Lebanon-Cyprus Maritime Agreement." 202
Nevertheless, Lebanon continues to dispute the validity of the 2007 Lebanon-Cyprus agreement
by providing various arguments regarding the conditions under which the agreement was
negotiated.203 Lebanon apparently considered the 2007 agreement with Cyprus a temporary
solution, subject to a future agreement between Lebanon and Israel.204
The main issue with the inconsistent coordinates involves "Point 1".205 Point 1 refers to
the southern most coordinate that was agreed to in the 2007 Lebanon-Cyprus agreement. 206
Three years later, Cyprus, "negotiated a line with Israel that begins at Point 1 and stretches
further south." 207 Lebanon now disputes the Israel-Cyprus agreement and characterizes the
agreement as contrary to international law and as representing an, "assault on Lebanese
sovereignty."208
Lebanon's argument, with respect to the principles of international law, is based on a
plain reading and application of UNCLOS and the location of a country's EEZ. With regard to
EEZ's, UNCLOS provides that, "the exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond
200 Id.
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200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured." 209 However, when states lie within 400 nautical miles of each other, those states are
expected to come to a mutual agreement. 210 Israel borders Lebanon to the South, the
Mediterranean lies to the west, and the island of Cyprus also lies to the west, within 400 nautical
miles of both Israel and Lebanon. UNCLOS also suggests that the maritime border between three
countries such as these should be located at a point equidistant between the three countries. 211
Point 1, however, lies about eleven miles north of where the UNCLOS contemplated point would
be. 212 This eleven-mile gap created a 300 square mile area that remains in dispute. 213
V. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVES
Although a multitude of methods exist for resolving maritime disputes, the tense political
relationship between Israel and Lebanon, 214 limits the prospects of bilateral negotiations.
Therefore, options such as referring the dispute to an international tribunal, or proceeding to
arbitration, seem to have the best likelihood of occurring and succeeding.
A. Options Under UNCLOS
1. Eliminate Non-peaceful Alternatives
UNCLOS provides that any dispute over the interpretation or application of the
convention shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the United Nations Charter.215
Although this may be one of the more obvious and self-explanatory rules provided by the
convention, it cannot be stressed enough in the context of an Israeli-Lebanese territorial dispute.
Both countries are likely fearful of what the other may do considering the history of Israeli
invasions, countless bombings and attacks launched from both countries, and the rise of
Hezbollah in Lebanon and its opposition to the Israeli state.216 Both Israel and Lebanon have the
209 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Part V, Art. 57.
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chance to turn the natural gas sector of their economies into important pieces of their long-term
national economic stability;217 therefore, Israel and Lebanon would be wise to eliminate all
violent dispute resolution options.
2. Annex V Conciliation
Annex V Conciliation under UNCLOS does not appear to be a well-suited dispute
resolution procedure for the Israeli-Lebanese maritime conflict. The main issue with Annex V
conciliation is the non-binding nature of the conciliators' decision. Assuming Israel and Lebanon
successfully submitted the dispute to conciliation, an unsatisfied state would not be incentivized
to follow the conciliator's non-binding report. Either state could simply reject the conciliator's
recommendations, and conciliation would be terminated. 218 Finding a binding dispute resolution
alternative is pragmatic in situations involving diplomatically adverse countries; however,
Lebanon should at least consider initiating conciliation with Israel in order to begin a diplomatic
relationship over this dispute, and possibly reach a non-binding result that could create a path
toward an amicable resolution.
3. ITLOS
The initial issue with resolution under ITLOS is that Israel is not a state party to
UNCLOS .219 Therefore, ITLOS may only obtain jurisdiction to decide a case involving Israel if
Israel expressly agrees to confer jurisdiction over the dispute to ITLOS.220 Consistent with the
subject of the dispute, Lebanon and Israel could confer jurisdiction to ITLOS by signing a
bilateral treaty. 221 However, due to the rough political relationship between the two counties, a
third-party state, such as the United States, could help facilitate this agreement. 222 By involving a
third-party state, Israel and Lebanon would avoid the unnecessary frustrations that come with
217 Wthlisch, supra note 3.
218 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex V, Sec. 1, Art. 8.
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bilateral negotiations. Assuming the jurisdictional issue could be resolved, once ITLOS heard
and decided the case, the decision of the tribunal would be final and binding on both Israel and
Lebanon.223 The binding nature of the tribunal's decision,224 the relevant expertise of the
judges,225 as well as existing precedent regarding a maritime delimitation case,226 create an
appealing, albeit far less than perfect, resolution option that Israel and Lebanon should seriously
consider.
4. Arbitration Under UNCLOS
Arbitration, rather than conciliation, would better serve the interests of Lebanon and Israel.
If either party ignored the decision of the arbitral tribunal, then that party would be in direct
violation of binding international law; 227 whereas, either party would be legally within its rights to
ignore the decision of the conciliation commission. 228 Israel and Lebanon might have some
concerns about submitting this dispute to binding arbitration, and therefore, it would be prudent
for the two parties to agree to an appellate procedure. 229
Israel and Lebanon could agree to an exclusive appellate procedure that would require the
unsatisfied party or parties to submit the dispute to a separate tribunal, perhaps ITLOS or the ICJ.
If either country decided to seek an appeal of the arbitrators' decision, then the other country would
also be legally required to follow through with the previously agreed upon appellate procedure.
Submitting to arbitration, with the option of appeal, may very well be the best compromise that
Israel and Lebanon can find. Because both the arbitrators and any appellate body would likely
apply UNCLOS as customary international law, Israel and Lebanon would gain the opportunity to
223 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex VI, Sec. 3, Art. 33.
224 id.
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226 Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar), Case No. 16, Order of Mar. 14, 2012, judgment and other related documents
available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=108&L=1AND1%253D1-. The tribunal decided its first maritime
delimitation case in 2012, in the case concerning Bangladesh and Myanmar. Id.
227 See 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex VII, Art. 11.
228 See id. at Annex V, Sec. 1, Art. 7.
229 Id. at Annex VII, Art. 11.
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better understand how their dispute should be decided according to the applicable body of law,
while at the same time maintaining the option of overriding the initial binding decision.
B. The International Court of Justice
It is unlikely that ITLOS and the ICJ would come to substantially differing conclusions
regarding the placement of Israel and Lebanon's maritime boundaries. Because ITLOS would
apply UNCLOS, and the ICJ would most likely apply the convention as customary international
law, Israel and Lebanon must think pragmatically, and find a way to agree on a binding
settlement procedure. Both countries might agree that the ICJ is the most ideal of the available
alternatives due to its history and legacy in international law, at least as compared to the less
experienced ITLOS. One fresh scar that might deter Israel from agreeing to submit to the ICJ
relates to the wall that Israel is constructing throughout the country. In 2004, the ICJ rendered an
advisory opinion, finding the wall unlawful as a violation of the Palestinian's right to self-
determination. 230 Israel maintains that the wall serves to provide security to citizens. 231 The 2004
ICJ decision is sufficiently concerning to raise questions as to whether Israel would agree to
submit their maritime dispute to the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean are both blessings and curses
for the people and governments in the region. The discoveries have given Cyprus, Israel and
Lebanon a tremendous opportunity to bolster their economies and become self-sufficient with
regard to their energy needs. On the other hand, the troublesome political histories of the
countries have, in some ways, cursed their ability to both agree on maritime boundaries and
begin to exploit the resources.
The discussion of the various procedural alternatives available to Israel and Lebanon for
resolving their dispute demonstrates that it will be difficult to escape the language and force of
UNCLOS. Bilateral negotiations would allow Israel and Lebanon to avoid the legal principles in
UNCLOS and determine their own boundaries; however, a bilateral agreement delimiting the
boundaries appears unlikely considering the present diplomatic relationship. Because submitting
230 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136 (Sept. 7).
231 Connor Gaffey, Israeli Separation Barrier Threatens to Divide Bethlehem Christians, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23,
2015, available at http://www.newsweek.com/israeli-separation-barrier-threatens-divide-bethlehem-christians-
308787.
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the dispute to one binding tribunal might scare away one or both countries, the best option may
be a more fragmented approach. Israel and Lebanon should submit their dispute to a binding
tribunal, such as an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS, and then provide for an exclusive appellate
procedure, through which a second, and superseding, binding decision would be given. Whatever
decision the countries ultimately make, it would be prudent to dispose of non-peaceful
alternatives and seek resolution through an unbiased international body, in order to begin to
realize the full economic potential of the offshore fields.
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